The second section, 'From Seattle to Doha', covers Moore's service as Director General of the WTO. Moore is often refreshingly blunt. For example, he calls Seattle 'the worst-organized conference ever ', although he does not specifically point to the then US Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky. (One can absolve Moore himself because he had just become head of the WTO a few months earlier.) Moore does not attribute the Seattle failure to the protesters in the streets : 'we didn't need their help to fail _ we did it on our own'. Rather, the differences in negotiating positions among the leading parties was simply too great to overcome.
Moore provides an excellent description of what life is like as DG -an exhausting travel schedule with numerous meetings that involve tremendous efforts at persuasion but in which he ultimately has very little power to bring different parties together. As he notes, the WTO secretariat has 'only limited independent authority and initiative taking rights, but no grants or loans to hand out, no licenses to issue and no influence over individual countries' policies '. Due to the rules of consensus, in which all 140+ members of the organization must not object to an initiative for it to move forward, Moore quips that the WTO is akin to a car with '144 handbrakes and one accelerator, which can only be used by consensus '.
One cannot read this section without having some sympathy for Moore: he is incredibly passionate in his beliefs and tireless in pursuing them, but he had very little independent power (beyond exhortation) to accomplish anything on his own. He is largely at the mercy of the big players in the WTO -the United States, the European Union, and the multitude of developing countries, all with differing interests and a multitude of reasons for why they cannot do something. But as he occupies the top spot in the WTO, he receives much grief from those working inside and outside the organization. As he put it: 'I kept reading that I had the most powerful job in the world. That's just not true. It would have been a lot more fun if it were. ' One area in which Moore succeeded in making a major difference to the world trading system is in giving developing countries a greater stake in the WTO. Moore instinctively sides with the underdog, and coming from a small country himself (New Zealand) he was concerned that many developing countries could not afford representation in Geneva and hence their interests would not be heard. Moore will be remembered for his tireless efforts to lay the groundwork for the Doha Round and for going to lengths to bring in developing countries and make them more a part of the WTO. That the term 'development ' is now commonly included between Doha and Round is a tribute to his efforts. It remains to be seen how development concerns will yield tangible results, but just giving this focus to the negotiations was not an easy task; it required persuading developed countries to shift the agenda in uncomfortable ways. In addition, Moore had to address the caution and suspicion of the developing countries toward free trade and the WTO. As he notes, 'It is sometimes difficult for sophisticated economists and politicians to understand the deep historic and cultural problems some countries have with the idea of free trade. Some still equate it with their oppression from colonial days.' With regard to foreign direct investment, he notes : 'The mindset of developing countries against FDI has its origins in the fact that so much of it involves mineral and resource extraction, and as such is a bitter reminder of imperialist times. ' Investment in labor-intensive manufacturing then runs into the problem of tariff escalation in the developed countries. While Moore's personal observations and insider details are always interesting, there is one disappointment and one weakness. The disappointment is that there is not more insider detail. Though he is now presumably free to express his unvarnished opinion, Moore gives us very little comment on how he interacted with the trade representatives from the United States and European Union. How did they deal with the WTO? What were their motivations ? Did they work through Moore in Geneva, or is the main action in Brussels and Washington? We get only a vague sense for how things really work behind the closed doors.
The weakness is that Moore does not reveal an underlying economic or political framework for differentiating between what should be done at the WTO from what should not be done. The role of DG is to reach consensus among different parties and to help negotiate an agreement. But he is no longer DG, and just because an agreement has been reached does not mean that it is a good thing. Moore does not reveal his opinion on a host of controversial issues, such as antidumping, trade-related intellectual property, and preferential trade agreements. Economists are skeptical about these facets of the system. But Moore is silent on whether antidumping should be scrapped, whether TRIPs should be a part of the WTO, or whether preferential trade arrangements cause problems at the multilateral level.
After his chapter on Doha, Moore discusses bringing China into the WTO, which he views as being even more important than the Doha success. His chapter on China and accession are very informative, making clear that China will have a large impact on world trade and the WTO in the years to come.
The final section deals with civil society, corporate social responsibility, and global governance. The chapter on civil society is particularly important because it is based on Moore's personal experience with NGOs and anti-globalization protesters. This makes for very interesting reading, not just because of the content but because Moore peppers the text with anecdotes, quotations, and insights. He writes that 'globalization has joined imperialism, colonialism, capitalism and communism in becoming an allpurpose tag, which can be wielded like a club in almost any ideological direction '. Moore himself was hit with the club repeatedly. Fortunately, Moore has a marvelous, self-deprecating sense of humor ; the protester adorning the cover of the book is a paper mache of his likeness carrying the sign 'Michael Moore Starves the Poor '.
Moore divides the NGOs into four categories -supporters (who favor global capitalism), rejectionists (who oppose global capitalism), reformists (who aim to ' civilize' capitalism), and alternatives (who wish to opt out of global capitalism). Moore dissects the sociological differences between these groups, some of which are serious and willing to discuss issues, while others are not. Moore found that 'many single issue groups do not wish to engage in dialogue; many of them are more interested in publicity stunts to raise fund and enlist new members'.
But Moore also recognizes that they raise legitimate issues and he agrees with them that international organizations have not been transparent enough. He says the WTO will have to work with these groups, but he is not ready to give them a seat at the negotiating table.
The final section is a surprisingly skeptical look at global governance. He is no champion of international agencies and multilateral bureaucracies, which he says tend to look after their own interests more so than the people whom they are trying to serve.
Moore does not see them as unblemished and even takes a cynical view. 'Institutions cannot reform themselves ', he states, and 'we have too many already '. In a penultimate chapter, Moore goes very far afield, from HIV and AIDs to migration to aging to the role of women in society to genetics and the human genome.
This book is based in part on speeches and papers prepared by Moore during his time at the WTO. The book sometimes reads like these papers, but Moore's colorful and even humorous writing ensures that the book is never dry. There is something here for everyone -economists, lawyers, and policymakers will learn more about how the organization works, what the major issues and obstacles are, as well as discovering numerous interesting facts and anecdotes along the way. In sum, A World Without Walls is not just an informative read, but an entertaining and genuinely interesting one as well. This book reviews efficiency and other considerations in both the design and operation of the world trading system largely as represented by the present institutional structure of the World Trade Organization, although regional agreements are also included. It is by two leading academic economists whose analytical credentials are impeccable. Much of the work and related discussion has appeared in leading economics journals, such as the American Economic Review. It is very clearly written, and earlier work has been skillfully reorganized and extended. The central message that can be singled out from the many presented, if there is one, is that MFN (non-discrimination) as a central pillar of the WTO rule system provides a central positive function by internalizing what they refer to as a terms of trade externality in the use of trade policies by individual countries. They emphasize how this terms of trade externality produces an incentive for a country to deviate from mutually advantageous agreement on freer trade, and so cooperation through nondiscriminatory trade rules is central to the WTO's function. They emerge from their discussion as strong supporters of the present WTO structure.
Economists are often taken to task by non-economists for their tendency to see the world exclusively in terms of their own models, instead of looking at the world directly and trying to make sense of what they see in front of them. In my view, while elegant and replete with formalization, this book falls into this trap and non-economists should approach it with their eyes wide open. Many central and key features of the WTO and its operation are entirely missing from the analysis and this detracts from the value of the formalization, and in my view masks these gaps rather than fills them.
I say this, because the discussion of the WTO in the book focuses solely on the WTO system as a set of rules, which constrain the use of trade policies by national governments. The issue they address is how to design this system of rules from a global perspective in light of terms of trade externalities. In my view the reality of the WTO is different, more complex, and more extensive in function. The GATT (and later the WTO) is in my view best viewed as a form of global constitution, which not only established rules for the conduct of trade policy, but also involved mutual agreement as to the application of these rules to subsequent bargaining on trade policies and also their enforcement through dispute settlement.
Viewed in this (to me) more acceptable holistic way, MFN and other WTO arrangements also become rules, which limit subsequent bargaining since they only allow for constrained bargaining on trade policies. Thus, while the authors discuss gains from trade, they make no effort to discuss the foregone gains from bargaining that the WTO structure represents. The gains from trade from reductions in trade barriers, and the gains from the bargaining which the WTO permits are two different aspects of the WTO. The book only discusses one.
Also the discussion of how WTO rules themselves impact on countries is incomplete. MFN, for instance, is a central issue for developing (or poorer) countries because of the way it influences trade policy bargaining. They can free ride on MFN barrier reductions between wealthy nations, but larger and richer countries will not negotiate with them since MFN requires any bilateral concessions to smaller poorer countries to be extended to richer countries. As a rule which influences bargaining it is a two edged sword for poorer countries, and this is at the center of their concerns over marginalization from WTO processes at the heart of Doha Round discussions. Other such discussions of the impact of the WTO's structure -familiar to those involved in policy debate -are also missing from the discussion in the book.
There are other frustrating examples of lack of acknowledgement of seemingly clear WTO reality. One is that avoiding the politically costly adjustment costs, which accompany trade liberalization seems in practice to drive countries' negotiating positions more than do terms of trade considerations. Also, differential country size is a key consideration. The GATT evolved between 1947 and the early-to-mid 1970's more as a bilateral EU-US trade accommodation to which smaller countries were appended since MFN guaranteed each of the larger two entities access to the other's third party agreements. While this feature has weakened over the years and the WTO has broadened, to analyze our existing trading system as rules for conduct between symmetric entities of equal size and power is in my view a little akin to Hamlet without the prince.
Another feature is the clear evolution of the WTO into a World Everything But Trade Organization through the addition of intellectual property, environment, and labour standards, and into a World Time and Trade Organization (WTTO) through the addition of intertemporal intermediation (banking services). My own view is that the WTO is now best seen as a forum for World Policy Bargaining, which raises the obvious issues of why only trade policies are bargained (which they now are not), why are there no side payments, and why the bargaining is constrained (MFN) ?
Thus, as a statement and summary of what analytical economists have to say about the WTO and world trade rules this is an outstandingly clear and elegant piece. It is up to date, and comprehensive. But the language and concerns of contemporary policy debates on the WTO differ from those addressed by leading academic economists, and non-economists may be led to believe that elegance and formalization should be enough to persuade them that the economists have things all worked out. They should read carefully, but look more at the words and ask what they mean than at the algebra. My own reaction to the book is that the elegant formalization masks a disturbing lack of substance for policy makers.
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